employees and dependents would have spent, had they been enrolled in a stringently managed plan with no consumer cost sharing. The other set of weights, based on fee-for-service claims data, measures how much each group would have spent, had it been enrolled in an unmanaged health plan with significant coinsurance and deductibles. Predicted annual expenditures per enrollee exhibit a 23% range from lowest (favorable selection) to highest (adverse selection) risk plans using the HMO weights and a 17% range using fee-for-service weights. The fee-for-service plan and group-model HMO with large enrollments have risk mixes near the center of the spectrum. Smaller HMOs exhibit the extreme forms of both favorable and adverse selection.
The statistical methods adopted in this study can be used to risk-adjust capitation payments to competing health plans. As mergers among HMOs and group purchasing arrangements among employers increase the average enrollment in each plan from each payor, however, risk differences among plans will be attenuated and the need to risk-adjust payments will be less severe. Key words: health insurance; adverse selection; managed competition; health maintenance organization. (Med Care 1995; 33:1161 -1175 The managed competition approach to health care reform relies on price-conscious choice by consumers to spur cost-conscious performance by health plans. To the extent healthy and sick consumers systematically a large private employer in 1989. Using demographic, personnel, outpatient utilization, and hospital discharge data from one large HMO, we estimate the annual expenditures each of the nine plans' enrollees would have incurred, had they been enrolled in that HMO. Most published studies use fee-for-service claims data as the basis for relative risk comparisons, despite the fact that consumer enrollment and policy interest are shifting toward HMOs. Risk weights based on HMO data will better predict patterns of utilization among competing HMOs than will weights based on fee-for-service claims. To compare our HMO-based results with fee-for-service-based studies, we use outpatient and inpatient claims from a feefor-service plan to predict annual expenditures each plan's enrollees would have incurred had they been enrolled in the fee-for-service plan.
The two sets of risk weights, based on HMO and fee-for-service expenditure data respectively, are used to calculate two measures of risk selection for each of the nine health plans. We compare the relative risk among plans according to whether they have large or small enrollments from the firm under study and according to plan type: group HMO, independent practice or network HMO, and fee-for-service plan. We compare the HMO and fee-for-service weights for particular health plans and evaluate whether the different weights produce different rank orderings for adverse and favorable selection.
Methods

Statistical Model of Medical Expenditures
Differences in enrollee expenditures among health plans depend on differences in epidemiologic risk, differences in benefit packages (service coverage, cost sharing provisions), and differences in plan efficiency (administrative costs, style of utilization management). To ascertain the differences in risk, it is first necessary to account for the benefit and efficiency factors. Relative risk among health plans can be conceptualized as the differences in expenditures that would be observed among the various enrollee groups if all were covered by the same benefit package and subject to the same style of utilization management and other health plan features.
Most studies of adverse selection control for benefit package and plan efficiency by studying utilization differences between fee-for-service enrollees who remain in their plan and fee-for-service enrollees who switch to an HMO.2-4 That approach assumes that utilization patterns in the year prior to switching accurately measure utilization patterns in the years after switching, when enrollees of the fee-for-service plans have joined the HMO. Moreover, it assumes that the small number of new HMO members who switched from the fee-for-service plan are representative of the larger population of long-term HMO enrollees. The one published study of post-switch utilization raised questions concerning the validity of both these assumptions. 5 The alternative approach to measuring risk selection uses data from one health plan to develop a set of weights for each enrollee characteristic, based on the statistical correlation between demographic characteristics and medical care expenditures. These weights are then assigned to the enrollees in the other health plan based on their demographic characteristics. This approach produces a measure of predicted expenditures for each enrollee, regardless of the health plan in which he or she actually is enrolled. Intuitively, it measures the medical care expenditures each individual would have incurred, had he or she been enrolled in the plan from which the expenditure data were obtained. Comparisons of predicted expenditures per enrollee across the two health plans identifies differences in propensity to incur costs, independent of benefit package and plan efficiency.
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This approach was developed by the authors in an earlier study using weights from a fee-for-service plan, which were then used to compare predicted expenditures per enrollee in the fee-for-service plan with predicted expenditures per enrollee in one HMO. 6 Here we extend the approach by using HMO utilization and expenditure data as the primary source for weights and by comparing risk among multiple competing health plans rather than just between two.
We use a four-equation maximum likelihood model developed by the RAND Health Insurance Experiment.7 The demographic and personnel characteristics of enrollees in one HMO were used as covariates to generate four sets of parameter estimates determining the probability of any medical care utilization during the year, the probability of (1) and (2) are estimated using logit; parameter vectors B1 and B2 in equations (3) and (4) by the parameters. The predicted probability of employee i using any medical care services during the year is L(Xi A1), the predicted probability of using hospital care is L(X1 A2), The parameter estimates and risk weights derived from them are subject to self-selection bias because employees choose their health plans rather than being assigned randomly. In general, we anticipate that employees will select the health plan whose benefit package and style of utilization management best corresponds to the employee's needs and preferences. For example, young workers anticipating need for maternity services are more likely to choose an HMO, which fully covers prenatal and well baby care, than are otherwise similar young workers not anticipating need for these forms of care. The HMObased regression parameters in equations (1) to (4) and measure of predicted expenditures in equation (5) will reflect accurately the utilization of those young employees who choose the HMO but will overestimate the utilization of covered services for young employees who choose the fee-for-service plan. Conversely, feefor-service-based weights will underestimate the utilization of covered services for young workers who choose the HMO despite accurately estimating the utilization of those who select the fee-for-service plan.
Heckman10 has analyzed this self-selection problem as a form of specification bias and proposed a solution based on extending the set of covariates used in the regression equation. A first-stage regression is used to derive the predicted probability for each individual of selecting one option over the other. A nonlinear function of each observation's predicted probability (the inverse Mills ratio) is then inserted in the second stage regression as a covariate. Ideally, the analyst would possess variables that strongly influence in- 
Application of Statistical Model
The A second set of analyses was conducted for Bank employees in each of the nine health plans using fee-for-service claims data from Blue Shield in a manner analogous to that used with the Kaiser data. This generated a second set of predicted expenditures for each Bank employee and dependents, a second set of mean predicted expenditures and confidence intervals per health plan, and a second set of expenditure ratios between each health plan and all health plans combined.
Results
Determinants of Health Maintenance
Organization Utilization and Expenditure (89%) used some services during 1989. Of those using any services, 653 (9.8%) used inpatient as well as outpatient services. The mean annual expenditure for persons using only outpatient services was $1,129. For users of inpatient services, expenditures averaged $10,720.
The parameters on the covariates differ substantially across the four equations, indicating the importance of using a multiequation approach. Compared with young men (the reference category), probability of outpatient and inpatient use does not increase significantly with age among men (within this employed population), but annual expenditures rises steeply and significantly with age among those with inpatient use. Gender differences are important and vary across the four measures of utilization and expenditure. Compared with young men, young women workers have significantly higher probability of using any services, somewhat higher probability of being admitted to a hospital, and significantly higher outpatient expenditures. Expenditures for young women admitted to a hospital are lower than those of young men admitted to a hospital. Probability of any use exhibits a U-shaped relation with age for women, with the highest use among the youngest and oldest groups. The probability of hospital admission declines after age 35. Outpatient expenditures increase gradually with age among women, as do expenditures among women who use the hospital. These parameters illustrate the importance of maternity care, a relatively frequent but relatively low-cost inpatient service, for young women compared with young men and older women. Table 2 presents enrollment size, mean predicted expenditures, the 95% confidence interval for the mean, and the ratio of plan mean to global mean for each of the nine health plans, using predicted expenditures derived from the parameters in Table 1 Only a modest and statistically insignificant association is observed between marital status for men and inpatient utilization in the fee-for-service plan, however, in contrast with the strong association for Kaiser. In other research, we have documented the tendency for married workers to switch to an HMO when anticipating inpatient maternity services, because of Fee-for-Service Weights Table 4 presents enrollment and mean predicted expenditures for each of the nine health plans based on fee-for-service parameters from Table 3 . Average expenditures per enrollee range from a low of $2,695 in Health Net to a high of $3,144 in Lifeguard. While the average expenditure for all nine plans is much higher using the fee-for-service weights compared to the HMO weights ($2,900 compared with $1,886), the spread in risk among the nine plans is narrower using the fee-for-service weights (17% compared with 23%).
In contrast to the figures presented in Table  2 using the HMO weights, the fee-for-service plan has predicted expenditures above the global average in Table 4 using fee-for-service weights. This illustrates the influence of benefit design, cost sharing, and utilization review on relative risk for different types of subscriber units and of the tendency for different types of subscriber units to select the health plan that provides the most congenial environment for the type of medical care services they seek. For example, young families incur relatively low costs (compared with older single men) in a conventional fee-for-service plan with heavy cost sharing restrictions on outpatient utilization and with exclusion of well-baby care from the benefit package but with few controls on inpatient utilization for chronic diseases common among older men. In contrast, an HMO such as Kaiser has little cost sharing, generous coverage of preventive and well baby visits, but stringent management of inpatient utilization for nonmaternity causes.
Health Maintenance Organization and
Fee-for-Service-Based Measures of Risk Selection Table 5 presents descriptive statistics on the distribution of predicted expenditures for the entire workforce (N = 16,182) using the HMO-based and fee-for-service-based risk weights, respectively. As reported in Tables 2 and 4, the means from the two distributions are quite different, with predicted expenditures per enrollee using the fee-forservice weights being 54% greater than predicted expenditures using the HMO weights. Of equal interest, however, is the spread of predicted risk using the two measures. The range and standard deviations of risk using the fee-for-service weights are 2.7 and 1.5 times the range and standard deviation using the HMO weights. While the maximum predicted expenditures is 8.5 HMO, health maintenance organization; FFS, fee-for-service.
times the minimum using the HMO weights, the maximum is 17.7 times the minimum using the fee-for-service weights.
The two distributions yield similar coefficients of variation, however, because the fee-for-service weights produce a larger mean, as well as a larger standard deviation than the HMO weights.
The differences between the HMO and fee-for-service weights in risk spread is consistent with the financial incentives in each plan. The HMO has no deductible and only very small copayments, which encourages use of ambulatory services and reduces the number of enrollees with zero expenditures, but stringent management of inpatient utilization, which reduces expenditures for the sickest enrollees. The fee-for-service plan has significant deductible and copayment provisions, which inhibit utilization of ambulatory services and produce large number of enrollees with zero reported expenditures, but no management of inpatient utilization, which permits high expenditures for the sickest enrollees. However, the narrow spread of predicted expenditures observed using the HMO weights is also caused partly by the manner in which the HMO expenditure data were calculated. weights. One plan suffers from adverse selection using the fee-for-service weights while benefitting from favorable selection using the HMO weights, but the differences are only slight. One plan, however, which lies in the upper left quadrant, suffers from 10% above-average predicted expenditures (adverse selection) using the HMO weights while enjoying (very slight) favorable selection using the fee-for-service weights. The two aberrant health plans both have relatively small enrollment from the Bank. Thus, despite various differences between the HMO and fee-for-service expenditure data, the final measures of risk selection among competing health plans are similar for the two types of risk weights.
Discussion
Health plan premiums reflect the generosity of the benefit package, the efficiency of the delivery system, and the epidemiologic mix of the enrollees. For price competition to stimulate efficiency among health plans, the effects of benefit coverage and epidemiologic risk on price must be distinguished from that of plan efficiency. weights developed using HMO data vary somewhat from those using fee-for-service plan data. As Figure 1 shows, the HMObased and fee-for-service-based measures are not dramatically different, but neither are they identical. In part, the observed variation is caused by differences in benefit packages, which would be attenuated if a standard package were mandated. However, some variation would remain because of differences among plans in utilization management practices.
It is important to highlight the limitations inherent in the HMO and fee-for-service risk weights presented here. The weights are based on the medical care utilization and expenditure patterns of individuals who were permitted to choose among multiple competing plans. They were not assigned randomly. It is to be expected that consumers select the health plan whose out-ofpocket cost, benefit package, network coverage, and style of utilization management best fit their budgets, needs, and preferences. The HMO risk weights provide unbiased estimates of the medical expenditures for those individuals who choose the HMO, but possibly biased estimates for those who choose the fee-for-service plan. Conversely, the fee-for-service risk weights provide unbiased estimates for fee-for-service enrollees but possibly biased estimates for HMO enrollees. There is no simple econometric solution to this data problem. In practice, however, the extent of the bias appears small. The HMO and fee-for-service weights produce similar risk rankings for the nine health plan populations studied here. Further research is desirable. Nevertheless, it is encouraging that this study, the first to calculate risk selection using comparable HMO and fee-for-service weights, found no major differences in the final risk measures.
A major substantive finding of this study contradicts the common presumption that fee-for-service plans invariably attract the highest risk mix of enrollees and that HMOs invariably attract the lowest risk enrollee mix. Using both the HMO and the fee-for-service weights, the fee-for-service plan had a risk mix near the center of the overall distribution, as did the group model The long-term solution to risk selection in a competitive health care system has three elements. First, standardization of the benefit package will reduce the incentives for risk selection and facilitate measurement of residual risk differences through comparisons of predicted expenditures among plans. Second, a consolidation of both purchasers (through purchasing cooperatives) and health plans (through the integration of physicians, hospitals, and HMOs) at the regional level will lead to larger and more similar enrollee populations from each sponsor in each health plan, further reducing variation among health plans in epidemiologic risk. Third, risk assessment and adjustment methods will be used to compensate health plans for residual differences in risk and, in particular, to remove the financial penalty currently suffered by plans that enroll patients with high cost conditions.
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